Another priority of the Burden Sharing discussions was the cost of keeping the U.S. military abroad. The largest concentration of American troops is currently in Japan (50,000), Germany (35,000 USD) and the Republic of Korea (28,000 USD). President Trump criticized the cost of these bases and argued that allies “should either pay the United States for its great military protection or protect themselves.” However, America does not use its troops as mercenaries just to defend the territory of American allies. The U.S. global defense network enables it to respond more quickly and effectively to a number of global demands, including protecting U.S. citizens, preventing piracy, deterring violent extremism, and preventing illegal arms trafficking in countries such as North Korea and Iran. U.S. allies are working alongside the United States in all of these efforts. The complex defence relationship between Japan and South Korea, with the United States as K negotiators, illustrates this logic. Footnote 100 A Japanese military analyst said: “Japan and South Korea are currently cooperating indirectly through the United States.
If the two nations cooperate directly, it would reduce the burden on the United States. Footnote 101 For example, a direct Japanese-Korean DCA would allow Japan`s signal intelligence to complement South Korea`s vast human intelligence and ultimately improve the ability of the three governments to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat. U.S. analysts and defense officials agree that all parties would benefit from the “triangle completion.” Footnote 102 But an agreement remains elusive, almost exclusively because of the persistent mistrust. As a result, the United States acted as an “honest broker” and adopted numerous confidence-building measures, including footnote 103, including secondary talks at multilateral events, the annual trilateral defence conference and small “Tabletop” exercises, as well as interim extensions on interoperability, logistics and procurement. Footnote 104 The success of these actions depends on the ability of the mediator to credibly inform each party of the reliability of the others. Correction: This article was updated to show that Beckley used two sets of data instead of his own research to find the majority of defense pacts he studied. The map attached to this graph has also been updated to show that New Zealand was no longer part of ANSS after 1986. However, third parties do not just act as passive spectators. Even if k trusts both i and j separately, a difficult information environment can limit the spread of trust.
This gap creates an opportunity for one-third party to take the initiative. Note 96 Kydd states that a “mediator who must establish trust between the parties must have some information that he can share with them about the type on the other side.” Footnote 97 At the same time, third parties often support enhanced cooperation between their defence partners, as tripartite DCA agreements facilitate interoperability, information exchange and coordinated response to reciprocal threats. Footnote 98 The “something to be gained” from ij cooperation is indeed essential for k`s ability to provide credible information. Footnote 99 By combining these elements, the direct links between k and i provide credible information on the reliability of each state and on the prospect of enhanced trilateral cooperation, which encourage k to actively use this information to promote an ij tie.